CURRENT LEGAL PERIODICALS.
LABOR.
Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation. Jeremiah Smith. The text of
this paper is a quotation from an editorial note in the Law Quarterly
Review, which contained the statement, "We have said here more
than once that these points will never be cleared up till we leave off
Mr. Smith does not favor
talking about conspiracy and malice."
the use of the words "malice" and "intent" as they have been used,
believing that such use has led to confusion of thought and a consequent confusion in the decisions. He finds it impossible, however,
to avoid the use of them, but he first jdefines them explaining the
interpretation which he intends shall be given them in his paper.
In this instalment of the article Mr. Smith considers the liability of
a single man acting independently, or not in concert with others.
He considers that there have been two views taken in regard to the
liability of a person for doing any act which though not in itself an
actionable tort, amounts to an interference with, or molestation of,
another person in his trade, business, or employment; one view being
that any interference of this sort is a tort which can seldom be justified; the other that it is no ground of liability. Mr. Smith contends
that the truth lies between these two extremes. "The plaintiff's
right in such a case is not a specific right of the kind fully protected
against all interference. It is, however, included in the broad general
right that a man shall not be intentionally damaged by any one unless there is a justification." The discussion is interesting, and the
"Crucial issues" are carefully presented, the presentation and discussion not, however, seeming to clear the air very perceptibly from
the obscurities which have gathered about the subject. The paper
is to be continued, and the next questions to be discussed are: whether
the "members of a combination are liable for causing damage, if a
single individual accomplishing the same result by the same methods
would not be liable? What constitutes a justification? Whether
bad motive operates as a rebuttal of an otherwise sufficient justification?"
Harvard Law Review, February,pp. 253-279.
INcOMB TAX.
The Income Tax and the Constitution. Edward B. Whitney. After
an examination into the opinions-so far as we may be said to know
them--of the framers of the Constitution, at the time when they made
their division of taxation into three classes, and also an examination
into the decisions in the income tax cases, and the Act of 1895, Mr.
Whitney says, "If a new law were taken up for consideration upon
the merits, the first question considered would be the relative weight
to be given to the various income tax decisions of the past. The Court
would be faced with a problem which has never faced it before; namely,
whether one series of decisions should be given weight because they
were unanimous upon the point involved, and because one of them
was substantially contemporaneous with the Constitution itself, and
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was enunciated by men who were witnesses as well as judges as to the
meaning of the words used in that instrument, or whether another
decision should be given greater weight because it was later in point
of time, and was regarded by five out of the nine judges then comprising the Court as distinguishable from the earlier ones, or as overruling them." Mr. Whitney thinks that he, as one who took part in
the litigation, would be presumptious in expressing a confident opinion
on the subject, and desires rather to call attention to the various
phases of the case. He does, however, venture to say that the decision
in 1895 was based upon a purely historical line of reasoning, "whose
acceptance by the ultimate verdict of historians I think a matter of
doubt." It is made plain by the further investigations of the author
that he can find no historical basis for the decision of 89 5, and that
he believes that the framers of the Constitution never contemplated
the possibility of such a construction of their phrases.
Harvard Law Review, February, pp. 280-296.

NEGLIGENCE.

The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Neglience.
Hugh Evander Willis. The writer of this article undertakes to ' trace
the progress of the law of bailments through the past and to study
its present status, for the purpose of prophesying its probable future
and discovering the direction it ought to take." Naturally, with so
much to do in so limited a space as a magazine article allows, Mr.
Willis does not himself go into an examination of the history of the
law of bailnents in the past; he is satisfied to speak of the theories
that Justice Holmes and Professor Beale have deduced from their
own investigations, and to state such and such points are "now certain." Having dismissed history we find ourselves in the present
day and in the United States, and ready to answer the question prepounded in the title. A paragraph gives sufficient space for the answer,
"All liability for negligence may be excused. " We next find that
"the courts are uncertain," but "whatever uncertainty there may
be as to the actual position of the courts, there is no uncertainty in
the mind of the writer as to what ought to be their position." Mr.
Willis declares, "I maifntain that, on general principles, parties should
be allowed freedom of contract here, and thus contract for exemption
from liability for negligence, if they desire." A half page is all that
Mr. Willis finds necessary to devote to demolishing all arguments
upon the other side. As to the "tort aspect," nearly a page is needed
to prove the writer's contention for exemption from liability, although
the cases do not as yet support him, but he was to prophesy and he
now prophesies that they will soon follow his opinions. When we
come to consider common carriers, inn-keepers, and others of the sort,
these interests are allowed to be affected with a public use, Mr. Willis
admits, but with apparent regret, "it seems to me that it is against
public policy to allow a common carrier to contract away its liability."
Rut he will not allow so much in the case of simple bailments, or even,
"in the case of innkeepers and other bailees affected with a public
interest." Mr. Willis might read with interest the remarks of Dean
Bigelow at the opening of the Boston University Law School for the
year 19o6-7, in regard to freedom of contract, and the results to which
the prevalent doctrines upon that question have led.
Harvard Law Review, February, pp. 297-312.
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EVIDENCE.

Evidence to Show Intent. Ernest E. Williams. This is a discussion
of the rules of evidence in regard to the proof of similar acts, and gives
a chronological outline of the cases decided in England and Canada
upon this subject. No American Cases seem to have been considered.
Mr. Williams argument is intended to show that the tendency of the
law, as shown in the decisions examined is toward not allowing technicalities in the law of evidence to stand in the way of proving facts
which go to show the alleged intention of the act charged. Mr. Williams says, "It is a salutary rule, essential to our ideas of justice and
right judicial procedure, and akin to, and almost necessarily flowing
from, the fundamental principle of our law that a man is to be adjudged innocent until he be proved guilty; yet the course of justice
would be seriously obstructed if no exceptions were allowed to the
rule. And, after all, it is the business of our criminal courts to track
down the guilty as well as to shield the innocent: the positive action
of those Courts must not be lost sight of in our endeavors to preserve their negative functions from the intrusion of prejudice."
Mr. Williams further says, "Opposition to this development, however, still exists. The judgments in R. v. Bond were not unanimous;
lawyers commenting on it have declared emphatically that it is wrong.
But are not these lawyers resting on the tradition of an old, rigorous,
insular rule, rather than reasoning out the needs of justice? Even
allowing that the rule in its old integrity (or in the rigidity it was at
one time supposed to have) was in consonance with the judicial
procedure of an earlier day, is it not well to remember, as Lord Coleridge said in Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Go., that the law of evidence has in other respects been widened, demanding a corresponding
extension of the rule excluding evidence of similar acts? And since
Lord Coleridge delivered that judgment there has been a still further
extension in criminal procedure by the Act permitting a prisoner
access to the witness box. Former disabilities, as Mr. Justice Darling
said in R. v. Bond, 'no longer exist, and, provided he have due notice,
an accused person may fairly be confronted with evidence relevant
to the issue now that he may give his own testimony, although it
would have been hard to admit it when the witness box was forbidden
to him.' Certainly, as the same learned judge contends, it is not
"admissible to strive for increase in the technicility of our rules of
evidence so as to narrow yet more the approaches to the source of
justice."', ."-" ___
.j %i;
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i " ?Law Quarterly Review, January, pp. 28-41.

LEGAL ETHICS.

Legal Ethics. Henry Wade Rogers. This is the address made to
the members of the graduating class of the Albany Law School, May
3a, 19o6. It forms a very interesting essay on the lines so often laid
down upon like occasions, on points that cannot be too often emphasized. Some of Mr. Rogers phrases which are especially noticeable
are, "The ethical basis of conduct for the lawyer is the same as for
any other member of society. That which one cannot honorably
do as a man he cannot honorably do as a lawyer. " "If one undertakes
to tell you that there is one morality for the bar and another for the
rest of the world, be assured he is a teacher of false doctrine. To
follow after him is to go to your own undoing." "Am6ng the duties
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which the lawyer owes the state is that of saving the judiciary from
becoming the spoils of party." "Never before since the government
was established has agitation against existing institutions been so
reckless and revolutionary and so general as now. The duty of the
lawyer to the state assumes new importance in the face of the conditions which now confront this nation. Let me, therefore, commend
to your attention the weighty words of a great constitutional lawyer.
In his address as president of the American Bar Association in 1894
the late Chief Justice Cooley said: 'What I desire to impress at this
time upon the members of the legal profession is that every one of
them is or should be, from his very position and from the license which
gives him special privileges in the determination of legal questions
and controversies, a public leader and teacher, whose obligations to
support the constitution and laws and to act with all due fidelity to
the courts is not fully performed when the fundamental organization
of society is assailed or threatened, or the laws defied or likely to be
in the community in which he lives, as a result of revolutionary purpose, or of ignorance, or unreasoning passion, unless he comes to the
front as a supporter of settled institutions and of public order, and
does what he properly and lawfully can to correct any sentiment,
general or local, that would in itself be a public danger, or be likely
to lead to disorder or unlawful violence.' To this eminent jurist it
seemed a low and very unworthy view of the lawyer's office to assume that his duty was simply to prosecute or defend in the courts
for a compensation to be paid, and that he owed no duty to society
to expose false theories and counteract public ignorance and inculcate
respect for law and courts and government and the rights of property."
Yale Law Journal,February, pp. 225-246.
COURTS.

The Suprenme Court of the United States. George P. Costigan, Jr.
When a new judge for the Supreme Court is to be appointed public
interest for the moment turns to that court. It is for this reason that
Mr. Costigan has written this short sketch of the history, functions,
and method of despatching the business of the court. The earliest
years of the court were chiefly distinguished by an absence of litigation.
"There was so little business that the Chief Justice varied' his duties
by running for governor of New York in 1792, by spending a large
part of a year negotiating with Great Britain what is known as Jay's
Treaty of November ig, I794, and finally in 1795 resigned as Chief
Justice to become governor of New York."
NZ
Marshall's appointment as his successor was proper in itself, but
the "Mid-night appointments" in which Marshall, who, though Chief
Justice, continued to act as Secretary of State until Adams' term ended,
took part, were productive of much mischief, and enmities which did
not end until the death of all parties concerned. This paper does not
attemt to deal with the decisions of the Court, but the author declares
that' the political character acquired by the court as a result of those
decisions needs emphasis. ". The right to declare all laws null and void,
state as well as national, which it regards as clearly inconsistent with
the constitution, it is declared "gives rise to immense political influence."
The discredit cast upon the Supreme Court by the partisan votes
of the Haves-Tilden contest, is noted. "The result was a bad thing
for the Supreme Court." Appointments have been on party lines,
but "the ermine tempers the man," and the judges are not often
consciously partisan, In the changeable number of Supreme Court
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justices there is noted a possible danger. Whether or not "the court
was packed" by Grant before the decision of the Legal Tender Cases,
it is possible that this might be done by a president whose faith in
himself was greater than his devotion to the Constitution. The President and Congress acting in unison could tie the hands of the Supreme
Court, and even, through the addition of new justices determine its
decisions. It was pointed out by Mr. Bryce that "the incident of
the Legal Tender Cases disclosed a weak point in the constitution
of the Supreme Court tribunal which may some day prove fatal to
its usefulness."
The thoroughness of the work of the court is commended: "No
case in the Supreme Court is ever referred to any one justice or to
several of the justices to decide and report to the others. Every
suitor, however humble, is entitled to receive, and receives, the judgment of every justice upon his case.
Yale Law Journal, February, pp. -59-272.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The American Journal of International Law. A Quarterly. The
appearance of a new Journal of International Law in the United States
is an event of much interest. The society which publishes the journal
was founded in :1o5, but only effected a definite organization in i9o6.
The first step was taken by some of the members of the Mohonk Lake
Conference on International Arbitration, who issued a call to the
members present at that conference. A committee was appointed
to consider plans for a definite organization, and the publication of a
journal exclusively devoted to international law, as the organ of the
society. Friday, January 6, i9o6, the constitution was adopted,
and a prospectus issued. A committee was appointed to arrange
for the issue of a periodical, and the American journal of International
Law, now issued in two parts is the result. The editor declares that
the object of the society is, "to foster the study of international law
and promote the establishment of international relations on the basis
of law and justice. This is the one aim and purpose."
This first
issue aims to cover the year 19o6, and is, therefore, very large, containing a quantity of very valuable matter. The editors do not
promise so large an issue every quarter, but propose that the space
devoted to leading articles shall remain approximately the same.
A mere mention of the titles and authors of the leading articles in
this issue will indicate the great value and interest of the publication.
International Responsibility to Corporate Bodies for Lives Lost by
Outlawry. John W. Foster.
International Law: its Present and Future. John Bassett Moore.
Doctor Francis Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies
in the Field. George B. Davis.
Calve and Drago Doctrines. Amos S. Hershey.
Insurgency and International Maritime Law.
George Grafton
Wilson,
Doctrine of Continuous Voyages. Charles Burke Elliott.
Notes on Sovereignty in a State. Robert Lansing.
The editorial comment is very full; there is a valuable chronicle
of international events; an excellent digest of cases involving questions
of international law; book reviews by the editors, and a supplemental
volume of eighty-five pages, containing official documents. It is
difficult to conceive of a periodical of this nature which would be an
improvement upon this issue in the matter presented or in the form
of presentation.

